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1. Introduction 
In this work, we are going to deal with a very special 
type of complex systems: Deontical Impure Systems 
(Nescolarde-Selva et al, 2012a,b; Nescolarde-Selva and 
Usó-Doménech, 2012; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-
Doménech, 2013a,b,c,d,e,; Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-
Selva, 2012; Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2013). 
They are Systems because there are objects and relations 
among them. They are Impure because these objects are 
formed by material and/or energy beings. They are 
Deontical because between its relations it has, at least, one 
that fulfills at least one of the deontical modalities: 
obligation, permission, prohibition, and faculty. We are 
talking about the human societies. Not a particular society, 
but to any human society, at any time and place.  
1. A system is an organization of the knowledge on the 
part of the subject S that fulfils the following conditions 
(Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013b):  
a. The subjective condition. 
b. The condition of rationality. 
c. The external condition. 
d. S knows what there is a system. 
The vision of a system interpreted by the set formed by 
different subjects within the system is determined by the 
belief system (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 
2013a,b,c,d,e; Nescolarde-Selva, Usó-Doménech am Gash, 
2014; Usó-Doménech and. Nescolarde-Selva, 2012; Usó-
Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2013) that the subjects 
conceived as true, about themselves, the system and its 
environment. 
2. An impure set is whose referential elements 
(absolute beings) are not counted as abstract objects and 
have the following conditions: 
a. They are real (material or energetic absolute beings).  
b. They exist independently of Subject.  
c. Subject develops perceptual significances1.  
d. True things can be said about them. 
e. Subject can know these true things about them.  
f. They have properties that support a robust notion of 
mathematical truth.  
3. An impure system is one whose set of elements is 
an impure set. 
4. A deontical system is an organization of the 
knowledge on the part of the subject S that fulfils 
aforementioned conditions and the following others:  
                                                                        
1 In any process, we can distinguish that it has a signifier as an inherent 
property, and having significance when it is related to the rest of the 
processes of the perceived Reality that the Subject considers as a system. 
Significa esto que todas las estructuras tienen información? The 
existence of information is independent of the fact that there is a Subject 
able to decode the message, to which the Subject is attempting to 
communicate. A esta información objetiva la denominamos significant. 
This objective information is termed signifier. The information in a 
message acquires meaning if a Subject decodes the message. A esta 
información subjetiva la denominamos significance. This subjective 
information is termed significance. Therefore, the signifier is an ontic 
property, considering that the significance will be a system of meaning. 
The signifier is absolute and infinite, the significance is relative and 
finite. The signifier comes from Absolute Being and significance 
generates the relative being. The signifier is interpreted as the material or 
physical form of the sign and is something that can be caught (perception) 
by some of the traditional senses of the human being. The significance, 
on the other hand is a mental construct. In our approach, the signifier has 
a truth value equal to 1, that is to say, ( ) 1v S = , whereas the 
significance has as truth value a real positive number ( )v s , between 0 
and 1, with 0 corresponding to absolute ignorance of the signifier 
(therefore of the process) and 1 to absolute understanding, that is to 
say, ( ) ( )v S v s= . 
A-signifier (A-ם ) or the first order signifier is the signifier that is 
inherent to beings, processes or phenomena of the referring context. B-
signifier (B-ם ), the second order signifier or connotation, is the signifier 
of significance s.  
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a. Subjects are the human beings. We can distinguish 
the subject as observer (subjectively outside the system) 
and, by definition, is the subject itself, or within the 
system. In this case, acquires category of object. 
b. Objects (relative beings) are significances Nescolarde-
Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013; Nescolarde-Selva, Usó-
Doménech am Gash, 2014), which are consequence of the 
perceptual beliefs on the part of the Subject of a material or 
energetic objects (absolute beings) with certain characteristics.  
c. Some existing relations between elements have 
deontical modalities. 
d. There is purpose (purposes). 
5. A Deontical Impure System (DIS) is a system that 
meets the conditions of being both impure and deontical 
system. 
The DIS (Deontical Impure System) approach is the 
following one:  
1. Objects are perceptual significances (relative beings) 
of material or energetic objects (absolute beings).  
2. The set of these objects will form an impure set of 
first order.  
3. The existing relations between these relative objects 
will be of two classes: transactions of matter and/or 
energy and inferential relations.  
4. Transactions have alethic modality: necessity, possibility, 
impossibility and contingency. They are ontic relations. 
5. Ontic existence of possibility causes that inferential 
relations have deontical modality: obligation, permission, 
prohibition and faculty. They are human relations. 
6. We distinguished between theorems (natural laws) 
and norms (ethical, legislative and customary rules of 
conduct).  
7. Each relation has intensity and direction.  
8. Between these relative objects it exists, not an only 
relation, but sheaves of relations and going in both 
directions, clockwise and no clockwise2.  
9. The sheaves also have intensity.  
10. An inferential relation has modal and neutrosophic 
components.  
11. In each sheaf there will be generating and generated 
relations.  
12. Sheaves of both directions between two relative 
objects form a freeway 3 . Relative objects united by 
freeways form a chain (network).  
13. This network is a chain of transmission of direct or 
indirect causality. Therefore in our approach network will 
be denominated chain4.  
                                                                        
2 A sheaf of relations and denoted as hik is the multiple relations existing 
between two variables xi and xk, xi, xk ∈  M. A sheaf is monorelational if 
there is a single relation between two variables. It is bi-relational, if there 
are two, and n-relational if there are n relations. The empty sheaf 
indicates the non-existence of relations between two variables. 
3 A freeway between two elements xi and xj denoted as ijΦ is the set 
constituted by the sheaves ijd h− , ijl h− and ijr h− . We can 
represent it as i jx x⇔ . Therefore, in a freeway ijΦ  there are sheaves 
of three directions: direct sheaf, reciprocal sheaf and inverse sheaf. 
4 A chain 
k
i℘  will be an abstract chain, the elements or variables of 
which are related by means of freeways, that is, 
=℘kω ωxxx ji .....⇔⇔⇔  
 
14. Being all the DIS’ objects directly or an indirectly 
related to each other, it will be formed by a single chain 
with multiple ramifications.  
15. An Alysidal set is one whose elements are chains5. 
16. Coupling functions between Alysidal sets can be 
established.  
17. Nodes are subject. These may be individuals or 
group of individuals (corporations, regions, states, etc.) 
18. Special coupling function of recognition 
denominated gnorpsic function can be established.  
19. Gnorpsic function allows operations of connection 
between systems. Gnorpsic functions involve knowledge 
and decision. 
In a Deontical Impure System we distinguished two 
main semiotic components of relations: Neutrosophic and 
Modal components.  
2. Neutrosophic components 
Plato defines three abstract ideals that must guide the 
life of the men: kindness, beauty and truth. Both first they 
                                                                                                                     
We represent the chain like
k
i℘ , in where the subscript i represents the 
number of constituent variables (p-significances) of the chain, and the 
supraindex k an arbitrary number of identification. 
In every chain 
k
i℘ there will be a number of freeways equal to the 
number of variables which are components of the chain less one, that is, 
if the number of variables which are components of the chain is n, the 
number of freeways will be n – 1. 
Each constituent variable will be a node.  
Each freeway that leaves from a node will form a branch.  
The initial node will be the root node.  
The terminal will be an apical node. In a chain can have an single node 
root but several terminals.  
The chain having more nodes will be denominated trunk and its terminal 
node will be top apical node.  
Chains whose root node is connected by means of a freeway with the 
apical node are cyclical chains.  
5 The alysidal set is the set whose elements are chains formed by relative 
beings united by freeways of inferential relations and/or transactions. 
The alysidal sets has the following properties:  
a. A relative object (p-significance) considers a monochain, that is to say, 
element of an alysidal set.  
b. An alysidal set can be considered like a special class of system in 
where their elements (chains) are not interrelated.  
c. Each alysidal element can be considered either as a system in itself or 
a subsystem.  
d. There is emptiness alysidal set ∅ .  
e. For an alysidal set Aal, the difference U – Aal , where U is the universe 
of discourse, is called the complement of A and it is denoted by CalA . 
Thus 
C
alA  is the set of everything that is not in Aal.  
f.An ordered pair is a pair of alysidal elements with an order associated 
with them. If alysidal element are represented by 
k
i℘  
and lk
j
j
ilj ≠



≠
=
℘ ,, , then we write the ordered pair 
as ( )ljki ℘℘ , . Two ordered pairs ( )ljki ℘℘ , and ( )vmun ℘℘ , are 
equal if and only if 
u
n
k
i ℘=℘ and .
v
m
l
j ℘=℘   
g. Let Aal and Bal be two alysidal sets. The set of all ordered 
pairs ( )ljki ℘℘ , , where ki℘ is an element of Aal and lj℘ is an 
element of Bal, is called the Cartesian product of Aal and Bal and is 
denoted by Aal xBal.  
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are properties or qualities of the man and the things. 
Nevertheless, the truth is not a property. It is a 
characteristic or quality of the enunciations, judgments, 
propositions, theorems, laws, that are declarations as well. 
The truth is a semiotic property of the propositions. 
Propositions can be true (or false) of different ways or in 
different senses. It will depend on the type of established 
proposition. LeShan and Margeneau (1982) establish three 
types of propositions (and therefore of truths):  
Empirical proposition: When the proposition and its 
associate truth are in agreement with the perception 
(perceptual experience). The empirical truth will depend 
on outer tests on the content of the propositions.  
Analytical proposition: It is that fundamental 
consequence of certain axioms or assumptions. The 
veracity (truth values) is contained in the same proposition. 
The logical proposition belongs to this group, but also the 
theological ones. The axioms determine the veracity. 
Therefore, the truth is within the system of beliefs derived 
from that particular logic.  
Scientific proposition: They are those that combine the 
analytical truth derived from reasonable axioms with the 
empirical truth. They derive from validated and accepted 
theories and that they are logical or mathematical 
constructions related, which have equipment connections 
with the perceptual experience through correspondence 
rules.  
We are based on the denominated neutrosophic logic 
(Gershenson, 2001; Liu, 2001a,b; Smarandache, 1999, 
2003; Smarandache, Dezert, Buller, Khoshnevisan, 
Bhattacharya, Singh, Liu, Dinulescu-Campina, Lucas, 
Gershenson, 2001) whose characteristics are: 
The Main Principle: Between an idea <A> and its 
opposite <Anti-A>, there is a continuum-power spectrum 
of neutralities <Neut-A>.  
Definition 1 (Robinson, 1996): A number x is said to 
be infinitesimal iff for all positive integers n one has 
1 .x
n
<   
Let 0ε >  be such infinitesimal number.  
Definition 2 (Robinson, 1996): The non-standard finite 
numbers1 1 ε+ = + , a number where 1 is its standard part 
and ε its non-standard part. 
The number 1+ is infinitely small but greater than 1. 
Definition 3 (Robinson, 1996): The non-standard finite 
numbers 0 0 ε− = −  a number where 0 is its standard part 
and ε its non-standard part. 
The number -0 is infinitely small but less than 0. 
Definition 4: The non-standard unit interval is the 
interval 0,1− +   . 
Numbers -0 and 1+ belong to the non-standard unit 
interval.  
The Fundamental Thesis of Neutrosophy: Any idea 
<A> is T% true, I% indeterminate, and F% false, where T, 
I, F ⊂  ] -0, 1+ [3.and such as 
 
) 0,1 .
) 0,1
) 0,1
a T
b I
c F
− +
− +
− +
⊂
⊂
⊂
  
  
  
 
with 
 
sup _ sup, inf _ inf
sup _ sup, inf _ inf
sup _ sup, inf _ inf
_ sup _ sup _ sup _ sup
_ inf _ inf _ inf _ inf
T t T t
I i I i
F f F f
n t i f
n t i f
= =
= =
= =
= + +
= + +
 
Although T, I, F can be intervals, any real sub-unitary 
subsets: discrete or continuous, single-element, finite or 
infinite, union or intersection of various subsets, etc, in the 
theory exposed here, we will consider them like intervals.  
The Neutrosophic components T, I, F are at each 
instance dependant on many parameters, and therefore 
they can be considered set-valued vector functions or even 
operators. The parameters can be: time, space, etc. and of 
hidden or unknown variables, such as:  
 
( ) ( )
( )
1 2 1 2
1 2
, , , ,..., , , , , ,..., ,
, , , ,..., .
n n
n
T s t w w w I s t w w w
F s t w w w
 
T, I and F try to reflect the dynamics of ideas, 
significances and propositions. 
T, I and F try to reflect the dynamics of ideas, 
significances and propositions. 
Only in the third type of propositions one 
occurs: ( ), ,sur sur surT I F , inf 1, sup 0sur sutT F≥ ≤ , e.g., it 
corresponds to Alethic modality of the necessity and to the 
surely probabilistic event. With respect to second classes, 
the analytical proposition, its truth will depend on its 
context, is to say of its logical system. In another logical 
system, it will lack true value. In the present state of our 
approach, we will not distinguish between the three truths 
and we will suppose each proposition (inferential relation) 
equipped with the three-neutrosophic components.  
The Main Laws of Neutrosophy: Let <a> be an 
attribute, and (T, I, F) ⊂  ] -0, 1+ [3. Then: 
There is a proposition <P> and a referential system 
{R}, such that <P> is T% <α>, I% indeterminate or 
<Neut-α>, and F% <Anti-α>. 
For any proposition <P>, there is a referential system 
{R}, such that <P> is T% <α>, I% indeterminate or 
<Neut-α>, and F% <Anti-α>. 
<α> is at some degree <Anti-α>, while <Anti-α> is at 
some degree <α>. 
Let א be the Reality, ב being a part thereof, such that ב 
⊂  א. Let S be a Subject, conceiving the Reality through 
his doxical filter, made up of the own beliefs system Ŧ of 
his culture, and by a certain language L. Subject S is in a 
certain psychic state of organization of the Reality during 
a determined objective temporary interval [ ]0 , nt t . In our 
approach: 
All inferential relation in a referential system (DIS) Σ  is 
a proposition <P>. 
The proposition <P> is T%, I% indeterminate, and F%. 
This representation characterizes the imprecision of 
knowledge or linguistic inexactitude, due to the Principle 
of Semiotic Incompleteness5F6, received by one or various 
Subjects. The sources of uncertainty can be: 
                                                                        
6 Semantic Incompleteness Principle (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-
Domènech. 2013a, b; Nescolarde-Selva, Usó-Domènech and Gash, 2014; 
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Stochasticy: the case of intrinsic imperfection where a 
typical and single value does not exist. 
Incomplete knowledge: ignorance of the totality, 
linguistic inexactitude, limited view on a system because 
of its complexity. 
Acquisitions errors: intrinsically imperfect observations, 
the quantitative errors in measures.  
In addition, it leads us to the own probability:  
The objective probability process uncertainty of random 
type (stochastic) introduced by the chance.  
We will interpret, of intuitive way, the subjective 
probability of an event like the belief degree in that this 
one happens when the random experiment is made. 
Nevertheless, it has been considered often that the 
probability is simply the belief degree that is due to assign 
to a proposition. The probability of occurrence of an event 
is the degree of belief on the part of an individual that an 
event happens, based on all the evidence to its disposition. 
Under this premise it is possible to be said that this 
approach is adapted when single is an opportunity of 
occurrence of the event. E.g., that the event will happen or 
it will not happen that single time. The value of 
probability under this approach is a personal judgment. 
Vagueness is another form of uncertainty is the 
character of those which contours or limits lacking 
precision, clearness, etc.  
Definition 5: The indeterminacy I is the degree of 
uncertainty, vagueness, imprecision, undefined, unknown, 
inconsistency and redundancy. 
Consequence 1: The subjective probability will 
measure indeterminacy.  
Let R be generated relation and ri the n generating 
relations. T, I and F they are respectively the probabilities 
really, indetermination and falsification of one relation. 
Applying the theorem of Bayes, we will be able to obtain 
the respective probabilities of the generated relation that is 
conditioned by the generating relations, independent 
between it.  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1
1
( ) ,
( ) ,
( ) .
n
i i
i
n
i i
i
n
i i
i
T R T R r T r
I R I R r I r
F R F R r I r
=
=
=
=
=
=
∑
∑
∑
 
Therefore we will have each generated relation will 
have the three neutrosophic components  
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1
, , ( )
, ,
n n
i i i i
i i
n
i i
i
T R I R F R
T R r T r I R r I r
F R r F r
= =
=
 
 
 =  
 
 
 
∑ ∑
∑
 
and so that.  
                                                                                                                     
Usó-Domènech and Nescolarde-Selva. 2012;): It is not possible to totally 
characterize a structure of objects or processes with a language (formal 
or not), or to completely present a portion of "truth" that this language 
can express about these objects or processes through deductive operation. 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
inf inf inf ( ) 0
sup sup sup ( ) 3
T R I R F R
T R I R F R
−
+
+ + ≥
+ + ≤
 
Let 1 2,R R  be two independent relations of same sheaf 
h, so that their neutrosophic probability is 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
, , ;
, ,
P R T R I R F R
P R T R I R F R
=
=
 
Then: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
, , , ,
, ,
, , , ,
, ,
, , , ,
, ,
T R I R F R T R I R F R
T R T R I R I R F R F R
T R I R F R T R I R F R
T R T R I R I R F R F R
T R I R F R T R I R F R
T R T R I R I R F R F R
⊕
= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
−
= − − −
⊗
= ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
 
and 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
,
,
,
,
P R R P R P R
T R T R
I R I R
F R F R
P R R P R P R
P R P R
T R T R T R T R
I R I R I R I R
F R F R F R F R
∩ = ⊗
⊗ 
 
= ⊗ 
 ⊗ 
∪ = ⊕
− ⊗
 ⊕ − ⊗ 
 
= ⊕ − ⊗ 
 ⊕ − ⊗ 
 
Let us suppose the case of sheaf h formed by three 
independent relations 1 2 3, , .R R R  Then: 
 ( ) ( )1 2 3( ) ( ), ( ), ( )P h T h I h F h P R R R= = ∪ ∪  
Then 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 3 1
2 1 3 2
2 1 2 3
1 2 3 1
2 1 3 2
2 1 2 3
1 2 3 1
2 1 3 2
2 1 2 3
T h T R T R T R T R
T R T R T R T R
T R T R T R T R
I h I R I R I R I R
I R I R I R I R
I R I R I R I R
F h F R F R F R F R
F R F R F R F R
F R F R F R F R
= ⊕ ⊕ −
⊗ − ⊗ −
⊗ ⊕ ⊗ ⊗
= ⊕ ⊕ −
⊗ − ⊗ −
⊗ ⊕ ⊗ ⊗
= ⊕ ⊕ −
⊗ − ⊗ −
⊗ ⊕ ⊗ ⊗
 
Generalizing for sheaf h constituted by n independent 
relations: 
 ( )
1
n
k
k
h T R
=
=

, 
then 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
1
1
1
1
1
1
... 1
... 1
... 1
n n
k i j
k i j
n
i j k
i j k
n
n
k
k
n n
k i j
k i j
n
i j k
i j k
n
n
k
k
n n
k i j
k i j
n
i j k
i j k
n
n
k
k
T h T R T R T R
T R T R T R
T R
I h I R I R I R
I R I R I R
I R
F h F R F R F R
F R F R F R
F R
= <
< <
+
=
= <
< <
+
=
= <
< <
+
=
= − ⊗
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− ⊕ −
= − ⊗
⊕ ⊗ ⊗
− ⊕ −
= − ⊗
⊕ ⊗ ⊗
− ⊕ −
∑ ∑
∑
∏
∑ ∑
∑
∏
∑ ∑
∑
∏
 
This probability of relations and sheaves uses a subset-
approximation for the truth-value like imprecise 
probability, but also subset-approximation for 
indeterminacy and falsity values. Also, it makes a 
distinction between relative sure relation, relation which 
is sure only in some particular world (s): P(rsr) = 1, and 
absolute sure relation, relation which is sure in all 
possible worlds: P (asr) = 1+; similarly for relative 
impossible relation and absolute impossible relation and 
for relative indeterminate relation and absolute 
indeterminate relation. 
3. Modal Components 
The inferential relations express the logical relation 
denominated inference, e.g., they indicate that the 
sequence in which it is integrated, will really have a value 
as long as the expressed thing in the previous sequence is 
fulfilled. Halliday and Hassan (1976) formulate it of the 
following way: 'possibly a if it is thus, then b'. The 
hypothetical inference has not necessary but merely 
probable character, and is also a type of synthetic or 
enlarging reasoning. Hypotheses can very be varied, but 
they have in common the one that are formulated to 
explain an observed phenomenon. Peirce (Haack, 1993; 
Murphey, M.G. 1993; Peirce, C.S., 1870) establishes at 
least three types:  
About organizations or facts no observed at the moment 
for formulating the hypothesis, but observable in the 
future verifying it.  
About organizations or facts that somebody could 
observe, although at the moment it is impossible to repeat 
the observation, since they are done of the past. They are 
observable in principle, but inobservables organizations or 
facts actually to belong to the past. It is a frequent case in 
sciences of the nature. But the hypothesis is not a type of 
exclusive reasoning of natural sciences. In human sciences 
also hypotheses on the past explaining what are 
formulated we know of the present. 
About organizations or facts that are inobservables 
actually and also in principle, because they are beyond 
the perceivable thing directly by the senses. In agreement 
with Peirce, therefore, the scientific activity does not 
respond to an exclusively positivist model that it only 
admits like organizations or real facts those that are 
directly observable. The scientist resorts constantly to 
hypothesis about inobservables realities to explain the 
observed realities, so that, without losing the connection 
with the sensible experience, he extends looking for it his 
rationality.  
Induction and hypothesis look like in their enlarging 
character, as soon as that both extend the knowledge 
beyond merely observed: individuals or characters 
(induction and hypothesis respectively). In that they are 
distinguished of the deduction that has explanatory 
character merely. However, induction and hypotheses are 
two different ways of enlarging reasoning. By means of 
the induction, we concluded that made similar to the 
observed facts they are true in no examined cases. By 
means of the hypothesis, we concluded the existence of a 
fact very different from the entire observed one, from 
which, according to the known laws, would be necessarily 
something observed. The first one is a reasoning of the 
individuals to the general law; the second, of the effect to 
the cause. The first one classifies, the second explains. 
Induction and hypothesis are separated forms of inference: 
it is impossible to infer hypothetical conclusions 
inductively.  
Inferential relations imply ontic signs and flows of 
signals which take semantic meaning within the 
established habitual epistemic forms between interactive 
pairs from s-impure object set. Se entiende por categorías 
los géneros supremos o más universales de los entes que 
se pueden predicar de algún sujeto.Categories are 
understood to be the supreme or universal genres of 
the entities, which may be predicated from any subject. 
De manera que cada categoría viene a ser una idea 
universal debajo de la cual se contienen varias ideas 
relacionadas contenidas bajo la primera.So that each 
category is a universal idea beneath which various 
related ideas are contained under the first. De aquí se 
infiere que la categoría puede tomarse, o bien por el 
género supremo de una clase determinada de seres, o bien 
por la serie o colección de géneros y especies que se 
contienen y colocan bajo un género supremo.From this it 
may be inferred that the category may be taken, either 
by the supreme genre of a specific class of beings or 
either by the series or collection of genres and species, 
which are contained and placed under a supreme genre. 
Toda vez que las categorías no son otra cosa en el fondo 
sino las varias clases de seres o realidades que pueblan y 
constituyen la Realidad, se sigue de aquí:As the 
categories are simply nothing more in fact than various 
classes of beings or realities which people and 
constitute Reality, it follows from here that  
Las categorías son divisiones del ente actual 
creado.Categories are divisions of the present entity 
created.En todas las categorías hay algo en que convienen, 
y algo en que se diferencian:In all categories there is 
something on which they agree and something on which 
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they differ: convienen entre sí en cuanto que toda 
categoría significa una realidad objetiva, una cosa con 
ella, pero menos universales, formando una serie o 
colección ordenada de (res) una esencia real: They agree 
in that every category means an objective reality, a thing 
with it, yet less universal, forming an ordered collection or 
series of. a real essence (res): se diferencian entre sí, en 
cuanto que cada esencia categórica tiene un modo de ser 
especial. They differ from each other in that each 
categorical essence has a means of being special.  
El estudio de la lógica modal ha tenido un enorme 
desarrollo y se ha ensanchado el campo de lo que haya de 
interpretarse como su tema propio. G.H. von Wright (1971) 
distingue varias "familias" de conceptos modales, 
sugiriendo que el campo de la comprensión de la 
modalidad está en crecimiento. The study of modal logic 
has developed enormously and has broadened the field of 
what should be interpreted as its own subject. Von Wright 
(1971) distinguishes various “families" of modal concepts, 
suggesting that the field of comprehension of modality is 
growing. Distinguiremos: We shall distinguish: 
Los modos aléticos ("posible-necesario"). Alethical 
modes (possible-necessary-impossible-contingent). 
Los modos deónticos (obligación-permisión-
prohibición). Deontical modes (obligation-permission-
prohibition-faculty). 
Las ideas dóxicas (conocimiento-duda-creencia-
incertidumbre). Doxical modes (knowledge-doubt-belief-
uncertainty).  
Los modos epistémicos (verificado, no decidido, 
falsificado). Epistemical modes (verified- undecided-
falsified). 
All the families having these structural affinities could 
be termed modal concepts and it is possible to speak of 
their formal study as generalised modal logic. In the same 
way we could speak of modal systems being those which 
in any of their relations have at least one of those 
categories or that the Subject conceiving it should use 
modal concepts. In our approach we will distinguish two 
main classes of modality: alethical (ontic) and deontical 
(semiotic). 
3.1. Alethical components 
Alethical modal components constitute the bottom drop 
curtain or substratum of the DIS. They are "natural" 
modalities, in the form sense they leave from the theorems 
or natural laws. Alethical modality constitutes an only 
concept, that it is possible to be outlined of the following 
way:  
Necessity (n) □ Impossibility (i) ¬◊ 
Contingency (c) ¬□ Possibility (p)◊ 
The two modalities of each column (n and c, i and p) 
form a modal alethical opposition, e.g., they are excluded 
in extension and they are implied in comprehension. 
Let  be the Mutual true exclusion and ⇔  be the 
Reciprocal implication. Then:  
 [] [] ,[] []
,
r r r r sphere of the necessity
r r r r sphere of the possibility
¬ ⇔ ¬
¬◊ ◊ ¬◊ ⇔ ◊


 
Both component of a line (n and i, c and p) they do not 
constitute an opposition. Forward edge (n and i) belongs 
to the sphere of the necessity. If r constitutes an event, a 
fact of the phenomenon, a property of the object or an 
inferential relation in our theory, we have in classic logic: 
[] [],r r r r¬◊ ¬◊⇔ ¬ ⇔ ¬ . That is, the impossibility of r is 
equivalent to the necessity of no-r. With respect to the 
second line (c and p), it belongs to the sphere of the 
possibility sight that the contingency implies the 
pluripossibility. And, therefore, the composibility of r and 
no-r: ( )[]r r r¬ ◊ ◊⇔ ∧¬  
Inversely, the possibility of r or goes jointly with the 
one of no-r, and r is contingent, or no, to knowing no-r is 
impossible, and then r is necessary by virtue of [].r r¬ ⇔  
 ( )[] []r r r◊ ⇔ ¬  
Let us see the first diagonal (n and p). The necessity of 
r (excluding the one from no-r), is equivalent to the 
unipossibility of r, therefore necessity implies classically 
possibility: []r r⇒ ◊ . 
It is a univalent possibility, against the pluripossibility 
of the contingency. Inversely, the possibility is against 
weakly to the necessity due to partial consubstantiality 
with the contingency. On the other hand, the possibility is 
also against weakly to the contingency by its partial 
identity with the necessity..  
With respect to the second diagonal (i and c), it 
contains a strong modal opposition: the impossibility, 
whereas negative necessity is totally opposite to the 
contingency. In short, the impossibility strongly is against 
the other three poles of the concept: an impossible thing is 
expelled from the Reality whereas the other three poles 
stay within the Reality. In addition, this last ontic 
opposition, is not own of the classic logic.  
Whereas category, and in agreement with Hegel, the 
necessity implies the contingency already because it forms 
a bipole, because the synonymous of the necessity is not-
contingent and reciprocally.  
We will notice that the dominion of composibility and 
its paper of contingency, determined accurately the 
limited and determined necessity, when drawing up the 
border that separates it of the impossibility. Reciprocally, 
all concrete contingencies imply necessities that determine 
their field of composibility rigorously. Possibility is 
composibility, e.g., compatibility of A with other terms or 
connections of terms taken like reference..  
The same negative definition of the possibility idea as 
"absence of contradiction" only in this context reaches 
some sense, because a "absence of contradiction", thought 
absolutely, does not mean anything; nor, therefore, the call 
means nothing "logical possibility" that many define 
indeed by the "absence of contradiction". It has to 
sobrentender itself like "absence of contradiction of 
something" (of A); but this something must be given like 
complex. Otherwise: absence of contradiction, since 
everything what can be thought is complex, stops being a 
negative-absolute concept and it are pronounced like 
contextual.  
The "absolute possibility" is therefore a development 
limit of the idea of composibility (composibility of Á with 
same itself) that will only have a differential meaning if it 
assumes that Á is simple and therefore, unthinkable; then 
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if A is complex, when "relating it to same itself " we are 
unavoidably inserting it in outer contexts, through 
multiple components. The idea of possibility is, therefore, 
based on the operations by which we constructed the 
concept of A; but this is not applied to the operations, but 
to the constructed objects and in relation to other objects, 
as system. E.g., the possibility is objective. The formal-
modal logical concept of possibility is obtained applying 
this same idea of composibility, and with no need to 
appeal (at the moment, and at least) to possible worlds.  
Let r be an inferential relation. We will define the 
following axioms:  
Axiom 1: The possibility of an inferential relation 
implies its existence: ◊r → r.  
Axiom 2: The necessity of an inferential relation 
implies its existence: □r → r. 
Axiom 3: The possibility of an inferential relation 
implies the necessity of its possibility: ◊r → □◊r. 
Axiom 4: The necessity of an inferential relation 
implies its possibility. □r → ◊r. 
Axiom 5: The not-possibility of an inferential relation 
implies the necessity of its not-existence: ¬ ◊r → □¬r. 
Axiom 6: The not-possibility of the not-existence an 
inferential relation implies the necessity of its existence: ¬ 
◊¬ r → □r.  
Axiom 7: The not-necessity of the existence an 
inferential relation implies the possibility of its not-
existence: ¬□r → ◊¬r.  
Axiom 8: The not-necessity of the not-existence of an 
inferential relation implies the possibility of its existence: 
¬□¬r → ◊r.  
3.2. Deontical components 
Deontical modal components are own, in first instance, 
of the existence of the life, at least of organized life and 
developed to the end, of the existence of the human being. 
Let r be an inferential relation. The operator O who means 
"obligatory" is that it does possible to describe acts or 
propositions like obligatory. From the operator of 
obligation and the logical negation it is possible to define 
the operators of prohibition (Ph) and permission (P):  
Or ≡ Ph¬r ≡ ¬P¬r 
Whose reading is: "(Obligatory r) iff (prohibited non-r) 
iff (not allowed non-r)".  
We may represent this last phrase of the following way 
(where G is a constant that means, "influences", it is an 
individual of which the previous thing is preached and → 
it is the conditional material) Or →□(Ga → r).  
If S means the fact that the norm determined in the 
inferential relation has been violated, then: Op →□(¬p → 
S). 
The rule of not monotony is the coherence exigency 
according to which a valid inference is not less valid by 
the addition of new premises:  
 3
1
3
1
2O O
O
r rO
r
P
r r
∧
→
 
The operator of faculty Fr ≡ Pr ^ P¬ is interpreted like 
"(Facultative r) iff (Allowed r and allowed not r)".  
The operator of faculty seems more suitable to express 
the following consideration: “Subject S is free to consider 
the inferential relation r". It would be: "the conduct to 
consider the inferential relation r is facultative" or "It is 
facultative that is expressed the inferential relation r" or, 
which is the same, "they are allowed both conducts: 
considering and not considering the inferential relation r".  
We will establish the following table of equivalences:  
Table 1. 
Or Ph r P r≡ ¬ ≡ ¬ ¬  
PrO r Phr¬ ≡ ≡ ¬  
PrO r Phr¬ ¬ ≡ ¬ ≡  
Or Ph r P r¬ ≡ ¬ ¬ ≡ ¬  
Principle of permission: Pr P r∨ ¬  and it is interpreted 
as about an act, on the part of the Subject, to infer a 
relation (or a proposition concerning an inferential act), 
either this one is allowed or allowed its negation.  
Principle of deontical distribution: P(r1 v r2) ≡ Pr1 v 
Pr2 and it is interpreted as the statement according to 
which the disjunction of two acts to infer a relation on the 
part of the Subject is allowed is equivalent, as well, to the 
disjunction of two statements: the one that affirms that the 
first act is allowed and the one that affirms that the second 
act is allowed.  
This last principle is written sometimes: 
( )1 2 1 2.O r r Or Or∧ ≡ ∧  
Table 2. 
¬r1 → (r1 → Or2) 
Or1 → (r2 → Or1) 
O¬r1 → O(r1 → r2) 
Or1 → O(r2 → r1) 
Table 3. 
¬r1 → ¬r1 v Or2 
Or1→ ¬r2 v Or1 
O¬r1 → O(¬r1 v r2) 
Or1 → O(¬r2 v r1) 
3.3. Relation between Alethic and deontical 
components 
Strictly speaking, the obligatory thing cannot be 
necessary according to the sense of the necessary thing 
previously expressed. The obligatory concept belongs to 
the semantic constellation of the ethics, moral, etc, e.g., of 
the ideological belief systems to which the Subject 
belongs, and that nothing has to do with the expressed 
synthetic identities in a theorem. The dichotomy between 
the semantic and ontic plane must be dissolved, because 
all semantic is ontic since the words (or the signs) also are 
made physical, although "artificia ", worked and selected 
by the human species. It makes no sense to force planets 
to draw ellipses around the sun. It does not have sense 
either to say that the planets describe those orbits forced 
by the law of the gravitation, but that the law of the 
gravitation, in any case, explains, propter quid, a 
phenomenon that already was well-known previously 
(Kepler) to the formulation of this law. Possible solution 
to this type of arguments happens to establish a mixed, 
Alethic-deontical logic in where some - all alethical 
axioms have not deontical costories that can also continue 
staying like principles in the deontical context. The reason, 
ad hoc elaborated is that, in deontical logic is not 
necessary to admit like axiom that the obligation must be 
allowed, which, in alethical terms, is absurd: The necessity 
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implies the possibility. This incongruence has not to be 
understood like paradox, or like mere gratuitous 
reconstruction and ad hoc. The true reason sublies in the 
necessity to save the phenomena, in this case: the analogy 
of which part between Alethic and deontical terms. But 
the possibility of denying the same analogy is not 
cancelled this way. The correspondence (of Alethic and 
deontical terms) between the worldly uses of these two 
classes of concepts (ontic and semiotics) does not 
constitute, seems to us either, a reason sufficient to 
maintain the analogies at all costs to begin with. Necessity 
no longer talks about the property of the parts of a 
discourse, but to the property added to the real existence 
of a cognoscible being if we come regressively from finite 
and contingent beings.  
On the other hand, if this analogy between necessity 
and obligation is subadded in an inequality analogy: the 
one that it mediates between natural (ontic) laws and 
normative rules (univocal from the perspective logical, 
ambiguous from the philosophical one). Then, not even it 
is such analogy: Cannot be disobeyed ontic laws 
(theorems) but, in any case, be controlled by means of 
other laws, also ontic. Normative rules (norms, no 
theorems) estimate, of necessary way, the possibility of 
failing to fulfill them. Normative Law (rules) and Natural 
Law (theorems) is not analogous, but sintagmas including 
an ambiguous concept, no analogous to that, granting 
much, we can metaphorically interpret.  
Ontic possibility (Alethic modality) creates deontic 
modalities. In the human individual, the free will needs 
two components: possibility and decision (faculty). 
Human colectivity is the interaction between multiple 
individualities, and in there decisions these two modalities 
sublies. We are going to summarize this fact in the 
following figure (figure 1): 
 
Figure 1. Alethical and deontical components 
It is the field of the possibility, where the Subject S 
conceives the deontical components, and where it infers 
the relations that characterize their peculiar vision of the 
Reality conceived like system.  
In a freeway, we will find transactions and inferential 
relations. We will have to distinguish between two classes 
of transactions: necessary transactions and allowed 
transactions.  
The first one is not influenced by human decision: we 
cannot prevent that the Sun illuminates the Earth or the 
continue bombing of cosmic rays. Theorems (natural laws) 
are strictly necessary. We can break neither the law of 
gravity nor the second principle of thermodynamics.  
In the second one (allowed transactions), its necessity 
is in conditional favour of deontic modality. For example, 
processes that are made within an atomic reactor in a 
nuclear power station are natural laws (theorems). 
Nevertheless, so that it happens will depend that a 
government forces the construction of the power station, 
or allows or prohibits it. Or of the facultative decision to 
ignite or not the reactor. And thus many examples.  
3.4. Relation between Semiotic Components 
It is possible to establish a relation between Alethic, 
deontical and neutrosophic components (Table 4): 
Table 4. 
Alethic components Deontical components Probability theory 
Necessity Obligation Sure event 
Impossibility Prohibition Impossible event 
Possibility Permission Totally indeterminate event 
Contingence Faculty Chance 
4. Conclusions 
A Deontical Impure System will have the following 
properties:  
They are objectively diachronic, that is to say, they are 
born, evolve and die in a Newtonian period [ ]tt ,0 .  
They are subjectively diachronic, that is to say, it exists 
an own subjective time of the system [ ]Stt ,0 , and so that 
[ ] [ ]Stttt ,, 00 ⊂ . 
DIS are open systems, that is to say, two exist 
environments, stimulus environment H’ and response 
environment H’.  
Both environments are systems also, but for subjects 
pertaining to DIS avoid this structure, for that reason they 
are possible to be considered like Alysidal sets.  
Interactions between the system and its environments 
exist. These interactions will be transactions and 
inferential relations. The transactions will be necessary, 
distinguishing between the ontically necessary 
transactions and deontically necessary transactions.  
Some of these transactions are contingent. Then, 
phenomena of fortuitous interaction of unforeseeable 
consequences for the DIS. take place.  
We have used, among other tools, the modal logics 
(alethical and deontic), Neutrosophic and epistemic logic 
(beliefs). However, the subject is very far from being 
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closed. In addition, we expose the following 
considerations: 
The permission (or the obligation) of a response 
depends of the relationships among the objects, the state 
and the knowledge about this state.  
The value of a certain response, not only depends on 
the denoted response and the meaning of allowed, but also 
of the moment when this response is expressed. The 
response will be probably allowed today, but that do not 
mean to be always accepted7. We should still guarantee 
the complete formalization of this interpretation with a 
formal semantics such as 'possible worlds'.  
It is not always necessary that a Subject S be able to say 
if a response is allowed or forbidden with regard to certain 
state of the system. A language should not be reduced to a 
single function of referring with regard to a factual or 
counterfactual world. Formalization of DIS by means of 
logical language demands that this last one be sufficiently 
expressive to reflect all the subtleties of the reality. In 
other words, these logical languages should be able of 
reflecting all the extra-referential functions of the system. 
A semiotic theory of systems derived from the language 
(DIS belongs to this class) would have therefore the 
purpose of classifying all the systems of linguistic 
expression: philosophy, ideology, myth, poetry, art, as 
much as the dream, lapsus, the free association in a 
pluridimensional matrix where will be interfered much 
diversified fields. In each one of these discourses is 
necessary, in effect, to consider a plurality of questions, 
the essence of which will only be comprehensible by the 
sum of all; it will be necessary to ask, in the first place, as 
it will be the purpose of this language, the function that 
fulfills, the reason by which has been constructed.  
References 
[1] Gershenson. C. Comments to Neutrosophy. 2001. Proceedings of 
the First International Conference on Neutrosophy, Neutrosophic 
Logic, Set, Probability and Statistics, University of New Mexico, 
Gallup, December, pp. 1-3. 
                                                                        
7 Theorem of Non Wished Effects (NWET) (Usó-Doménech and 
Nescolarde-Selva, 2012, 2013) derived of Gödel theorem had demostred 
that the goal of reducing Reality to systemic conception (models) cannot 
be totally reached. For each constructed systemic conception, can happen 
to it one of the two following things:  
Either some allowed responses are not produced or  
Else some forbidden responses are produced.  
What would it mean to say that Reality is reduced to a given systemic 
conception? It would mean that system produces as response each 
allowed response of the Reality, but also forbidden responses for the 
system. That is to say: any allowed response is produced from the system 
but that forbidden response is so produced. To the forbidden responses 
produced by the system we will denominate nonwished effects.  
In economics are often called “perverse effects”. In the social sciences 
are unintended consequences (sometimes unanticipated consequences or 
unforeseen consequences) are outcomes that are not the ones intended by 
a purposeful action. The concept has long existed but was named and 
popularized in the twentieth century by American sociologist Robert K. 
Merton. As example prohibition in the 1920s the USA, originally 
enacted to suppress the alcohol trade, drove many small-time alcohol 
suppliers out of business and consolidated the hold of large-scale 
organized crime over the illegal alcohol industry. Since alcohol was still 
popular, criminal organizations producing alcohol were well funded and 
hence also increased their other activities. Similarly, the war on drugs, 
intended to suppress the illegal drug trade, instead consolidates the 
profitability of drug cartels 
[2] Haack, S. 1993. Peirce and Logicism: Notes Towards an 
Exposition, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, (29), 45.  
[3] Halliday, M. A. K. and R. Hassan. 1976. Cohesion in English. 
London: Longman.  
[4] LeShan, L. and Margenau, H. 1982. Einstein’s Space and Van 
Gogh’s Sky. MacMillan Publ. Co. Inc. New York.  
[5] Liu, F. 2001a. Dynamic Modeling of Multidimensional Logic in 
Multiagent Environment. International Conferences on Info-tech 
and Info-net Proceedings. IEEE Press, People’s Post & 
Telecommunications Publishing House China, 2001, pp. 241-245.  
[6] Liu, F. 2001b. Name, Denominable and Undenominable. On 
Neither <A> Nor <Anti-A>. Proceedings of the First 
International Conference on Neutrosophy, Neutrosophic Logic, 
Set, Probability and Statistics. University of New Mexico, Gallup, 
December, pp. 1-3. 
[7] Maddy, P. (1990), Realism in Mathematics, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
[8] Murphey, M.G. 1993. The Development of Peirce’s Philosophy, 
Hackett, Indianapolis, 60.  
[9] Nescolarde-Selva, J., Vives Maciá, F., Usó-Doménech, J.L., 
Berend, D. 2012a. An introduction to Alysidal Algebra I. 
Kybernetes 41 (1/2), pp. 21-34.  
[10] Nescolarde-Selva, J., Vives Maciá, F., Usó-Doménech, J.L., 
Berend,. D. 2012b.An introduction to Alysidal Algebra II. 
Kybernetes 41(5/6), pp. 780-793.  
[11] Nescolarde-Selva, J. and Usó-Doménech, J.L. 2012. An 
introduction to Alysidal Algebra III. Kybernetes, 41 (10), pp 1638-
1649. 
[12] Nescolarde-Selva, J. A. and Usó-Doménech, J. 2013a. Semiotic 
vision of ideologies. Foundations of Science.  
[13] Nescolarde-Selva, J. A. and Usó-Doménech, J. 2013b. Reality, 
System and Impure Systems. Foundations of Science.  
[14] Nescolarde-Selva, J. and Usó-Doménech, J. 2013. Topological 
Structures of Complex Belief Systems. Complexity. Vol 19, 1, pp. 
46-62. 
[15] Nescolarde-Selva, J. and Usó-Doménech, J. 2013d. Topological 
Structures of Complex Belief Systems (II): Textual 
Materialization. Complexity. Vol 19, 2. pp. 50-62. 
[16] Nescolarde-Selva, J. and Usó-Doménech, J. 2013f. Introduction to 
Alysidal Algebra V: Phenomenological components. Kybernetes. 
Vol. 42, 8, pp. 1248-1264. 
[17] Nescolarde-Selva, J., Usó-Doménech, J. and Gash, H. 2014. A 
theorical point of view of reality, perception and language. 
Complexity. 
[18] Peirce, C.S. 1870. Description of a Notation for the Logic of 
Relatives, Resulting from an Amplification of the Conception of 
Boole’s Calculus of Logic. American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences. CP 3. pp. 45-149.  
[19] Robinson, A. 1996. Non-Standard Analysis. Princenton University 
Press. Princenton, NJ.  
[20] Smarandache, F. A. 1999. Unifying Field in Logics: Neutrosophic 
Logic./ Neutrosophy, Neutrosophic Set, Neutrosophic Probability 
(second edition), American Research Press. 
[21] Smarandache, F. A. 2003. Unifying Field in Logics: Neutrosophic 
Logic. Neutrosophy, Neutrosophic Set, Neutrosophic Probability 
and Statistics, third edition, Xiquan, Phoenix.  
[22] Smarandache, F., Dezert, J., Buller, A., Khoshnevisan, M. 
Bhattacharya, S., Singh, S., Liu, F., Dinulescu-Campina, Gh. C., 
Lucas, C.,. Gershenson, C. 2001. Proceedings of the First 
International Conference on Neutrosophy, Neutrosophic Logic, 
Neutrosophic Set, Neutrosophic Probability and Statistics, The 
University of New Mexico, Gallup Campus, 1-3 December. 
[23] Usó-Domènech, J.L. and Nescolarde-Selva, J. 2012. Mathematics 
and Semiotical Theory of Ideological Systems. Lambert Academic 
Publishing. Saarbrucken. Germany.  
[24] Usó-Doménech, J. and Nescolarde-Selva, J. 2013. Introduction to 
Alysidal Algebra IV. Kybernetes. Vol. 42, 8, pp. 1235-1247. 
[25] von Wright, G.H. Explanation and Understanding. Cornell 
University Press. New York. 1971. 
 
